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This Article describes some of the possible legal ramifications of
the use of "software locks" by software vendors. Since the author
has been unable to find any reported cases that deal specifically
with the use of software locks, this is a somewhat ambitious endeavor. The lack of specific precedents is not foreign to those who
practice what is commonly known as "computer law," however. It is
often necessary to draw analogies to existing, non-computer-related
law. This Article is an example of such an undertaking.
The legal questions surrounding the use of software locks fall
into two general categories: 1) whether such devices offer legally
enforceable protection for the software vendor; and 2) what the legal
ramifications are regarding their misuse. After defining "software
locks" and examining reasons for their use, this Article will explore
some possible answers to these questions.
I.

SOFTWARE LOCKS DEFINED

For the purposes of this Article, a "software lock" is a technical
measure employed by a software vendor to prevent unauthorized
use of the software. The most commonly used measure is one which
t © Edward C. Saltzberg 1984.
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar. J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1976;
M.B.A., Boston University, 1973; B.A., Boston University, 1969.
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establishes an expiration date after which the program will cease to
operate. For example, the date May 1, 1984 is embedded in the
software. Each time the software is initialized, it checks to see if the
current date is earlier than the embedded date. If so, the program
will continue to operate. If not (e.g., the current date is May 2, 1984),
the software either will not operate or, in a more aggressive software
lock, will erase itself.'
This simple type of software lock can be bypassed by a user in
either of two ways. First, a user may simply enter a false value for
the current date, that is, a date that he knows is before the expiration date. This procedure may be difficult in cases where the subject software uses the actual current date to perform date
calculations, or to print or display the actual current date in the
heading of the output of the program.
The second method by which a user may bypass the expiration
date is to alter the date embedded in the software itself. Typically,
software is distributed in "binary code," rather than "source code"
form. Source code is the actual computer program written in a language understandable to anyone who has had training in its use. On
the other hand, binary code (also "executable code" or "object
code") is not easily understandable by human beings. It is the
product of a process whereby the source code is translated by the
computer into a form which the computer can then understand, appearing to the reader as a set of "O's" and "l's." It is difficult, but not
impossible, for one who is knowledgeable about the software in
question to find and alter the binary code version of a software lock.
The process of decoding the expiration date software lock is
simplified if the user knows exactly how the lock is implemented.
Disclosing the nature of the software lock is similar to telling a car
thief exactly what type of antitheft protection a particular car has.
A skilled car thief, given enough time, can bypass just about any antitheft device. The disclosure of the type of protection device used
greatly reduces the amount of time needed to bypass it.
A software developer who goes to the trouble of employing a
software lock generally does not disclose how the lock is employed.
One can surmise, however, that the software locks actually used are
more sophisticated than the simple version described above. For
example, the software developer may employ a procedure in which
1. A software lock that not only erases itself, but also erases or scrambles the
user's data is beyond the scope of this Article. Such a lock might involve a tortious or
criminal interference with the user's property. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 42
(West 1984); ch. 266, § 30(4) (West 1970 & Supp. 1984) (proscribing misappropriation
or larceny of trade secrets). See generally Howitt, Of Worms and Booby Traps, Im'FoWoRLD, Nov. 19, 1984, at 45, 46.
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the date entered by the user must be later than the date entered the
last time the software was used, but earlier than the embedded expiration date. Additionally, a software lock may count the number
of times the software is initialized. The developer would estimate
how many times a user would initiate the program within a certain
defined period of time and use that as all or part of the software
lock.
Another type of software lock is one in which the computer's serial number is embedded in the software so that the software will
only operate on the designated computer. The serial number
software lock may be technically possible on larger computer systems, but is not readily available for personal or micro computers.
One type of copy protection that has become popular only
within the past several months is fingerprinted diskettes. This is not
a software lock as such, but a unique way of physically marking
each diskette. The software (without the fingerprint) can still be
copied, but the program will not run unless the fingerprinted diskette is physically present in the computer. In other words, the user
must put the original diskette provided by the vendor in the computer; a copy of that diskette without the unique fingerprint will not
execute. One must go to considerable effort to bypass the fingerprint lock, a process that may discourage the casual copier and will
test the determination of the confirmed software pirate.
As time goes by, it is likely that the software industry will devise more effective techniques for guarding against unauthorized
use. Meanwhile, the legal ramifications of the use of software locks
ought to be considered.
II.

REASONS FOR USING SOFTWARE LOCKS

The purpose of the software lock is to force the user to perform
some act, usually the payment of money, to avoid the automatic
shutdown of the program. Upon the performance of the act, the
software vendor reinitializes the software or otherwise disables the
software lock. It should be noted that although a software lock will
not prevent unauthorized copying, it may prevent operation of an
unauthorized copy that includes the lock.
Perhaps the most common use of software locks is with demonstration versions of software. Since most users want to try software
before they buy it, many vendors offer a demonstration version for a
nominal or no fee. The demonstration version can be either a limited capacity or fully featured version that is usable for a limited period of time, usually thirty days. The fully featured version is
preferable, since it enables the user to experience the full power of
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the software. By offering this version, however, vendors incur the
risk that less scrupulous users will bypass the software lock and obtain free use of the software.
It is estimated that at least forty percent of the software in circulation is unauthorized. 2 There are several basic reasons underlying this phenomenon. First, it is extremely easy to copy software;
the process takes from a few seconds to several minutes, depending
on the software's volume. Software is easier to copy than videotape.
While two recorders are required to copy a videotape, only one computer is required to copy software. Indeed, most vendors encourage
the copying of their software for back-up purposes. 3 Second, unauthorized software copying is not as clearly perceived as a legal and
ethical violation as, for example, videotape copying. Third, the economic incentive for unauthorized software copying is quite significant. A single software license generally costs at least several
hundred dollars and, in many cases, thousands. Finally, it is extremely unlikely a vendor will discover those persons making unauthorized copies of its software, let alone commence litigation for
what may be both civil and criminal copyright violations.
Worldwide revenues from software sales are now estimated to
be $4 billion. To put that figure in perspective, worldwide revenues
from the publication of books are only $9 billion. 4 By 1986, software
sales are estimated to exceed $16 billion.5 Revenue losses from the
unauthorized use of software are now and will continue to be enormous. Software locks can be a critical security measure of significant economic value.
IIL

THE SOFTWARE LOCK AS AN ARTICLE
NINE SECURITY INTEREST

Section 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) defines "security interest" as "an interest in personal property or fix2. Azzara, Copyright Protectionfor Software: Court Rule Seen as Landmark,
Computer Sys. News, Sept. 12, 1983, at 10; Tyler, Only One Per Customer,DATAMATION,
Apr. 15, 1984, at 49; Can Software Makers Win the War againstPiracy?,Bus. WK., Apr.
30, 1984, at 108, 109.
3. See IBM CORP., IBM PC GUIDE TO OPERATIONS at 3-26 (1983) ("Before you begin to use your software purchase, you should ... make a copy of the diskette we
provide . . . ."); OSBORNE COMPUTER CORP., dBASE 1I ASSEMBLY-LANGUAGE RELATIONAL DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM VERSION 2.36 (Manual Revision IC, Dec. 10,
1982) at 9.
4. Bigelow, Copyrights and Computer Software-A Conference Summary, COMPUTER L. & TAx REP., Apr. 1984, at 3 (quoting IBM's senior corporate patent counsel).
5. Rosenberg, Software Piracy: Formulating a Plan for Protection, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 12, 1983, at 149.
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tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation"
(emphasis added).
U.C.C. section 9-102 sets forth the policy and subject matter of
Article Nine. It states that Article Nine applies "to any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts. .. "
Based on sections 1-201(37) and 9-102, it appears that a software
lock falls squarely within Article Nine, provided that it is intended
to secure the payment of money or the performance of an obligation.
Appendix A provides a sample contract between a licensor and
licensee regarding the use of computer software, fictionally known
as "GENDOC." 6 Paragraph 7 of the agreement sets forth five different conditions that can trip the software lock. The conditions concern the fulfillment of the licensee's obligations under the License
Agreement or other agreements between the parties, including nonpayment of money due.
Is the GENDOC License Agreement a "security agreement"?
U.C.C. section 9-105(1) (L) defines a "security agreement" as "an
agreement which creates or provides for a security interest .....
7
There is no requirement that the agreement be labelled as such.
Whether a particular document or transaction creates a security interest depends upon the intent of the parties. 8 Under U.C.C. section
9-203, a security interest is enforceable against the debtor or third
parties if the security agreement is signed by the debtor and contains a description of the collateral. Since the GENDOC License
Agreement would be signed by the debtor and describes the collateral, it appears to meet the Article Nine requirements for a security
agreement. 9
6. See infra p. 173.
7. Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976) (application for

certificate of title describing collateral and signed by debtor found to constitute a security agreement), overruled on other grounds,Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 117 IL
App. 3d 1001, 454 N.E.2d 357 (1983).
8. See Foley Machine Co. v. John T. Brady Co., 62 Misc. 2d 777, 310 N.Y.S.2d 49
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).

9. An interesting question arises where a vendor provides a user with a demonstration version of the software under a "blisterpack" license. A blisterpack license is
a unilateral agreement from the vendor which essentially says the user agrees to the
terms of the license agreement if the user tears open the plastic blisterpack covering
the software diskette. Because such a license agreement is not physically signed by
the user, it may not satisfy the requirements of section 9-203. Furthermore, it does
not appear that the action of opening the blisterpack would fall within the definition
of "signature" provided in U.C.C. § 1-201(39), which "includes any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with a present intention to authenticate a writing." Opening the
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What is the collateral? U.C.C. section 9-105(c) states, "'collateral' means the property subject to a security interest. . . ." In the
GENDOC License Agreement, the collateral is the non-exclusive
and non-transferable license to use the GENDOC. While a license
is property in which a valid security interest may lie,' 0 the question
may be asked whether a license to use software is the type of property that can be used to secure an interest.
It is clear that if software falls in the categories of either
"goods" or "general intangibles," then it is the type of property to
which a security interest may lie. Distinguishing between software
as goods and software as general intangibles may be an interesting
academic exercise, but the distinction is not necessary to answer
the threshold question of whether a software lock falls within Article Nine." Nevertheless, the distinction may have some relevance
to the questions of when a security interest attaches, proper jurisdiction, proper methods of perfection, and proper methods of realizing on software that is collateral. 12 The distinction may also be
critically important in determining a secured party's rights under
U.C.C. section 9-503.13
Certain transactions are excluded from Article Nine by U.C.C.
section 9-104. One of those exclusions relates to a security interest
subject to any statute of the United States to the extent that such
statute governs the rights of parties to, and third parties affected by,
transactions in particular types of property. Since software now
clearly appears to be copyrightable subject matter, 14 and copyright
is governed exclusively by federal law, 15 software may be excluded
from Article Nine under this provision. It is not clear, however, that
federal copyright law preempts all of the Article Nine provisions
blisterpack may not rise to the level of creating a symbol intended to authenticate a

writing.
For an analysis of the enforceability of blisterpack licenses, see Reynolds, The
Self-Executing License: A Legal Fiction,2 COMPUTER L. REP. 549 (1984).
10. Bogus v. American Nat'l Bank of Cheyenne, 401 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1968); Gibson v. Alaska Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 377 F. Supp. 151 (D. Alaska 1974). But
cf. In re Midland Services, Inc., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calaghan) 499 (D. Neb. 1971).
11. See Semple, The Legal Incidence of Computer Software in its Use as Collateral in Secured Transactions,7 CANADIAN Bus. L J. 450 (1982-83).
12. Id. at 455.
13. See discussion infra at § IV.
14. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH)
25,529 (D.
Idaho 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C. D. Cal.
1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.

1981).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
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that apply to a security interest. Clearly, the Copyright Act
preempts the Article Nine filing provisions with regard to assignments of copyright, 16 but it does not seem to contain sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the parties and third parties to exclude
security interests in copyrights from the provisions of Article Nine.
The exclusionary language in U.C.C. section 9-104(a) applies only
"to the extent that [the federal copyright law] governs the rights of
the parties. . . ." Therefore, if the federal copyright law contains no
provisions governing the rights of the parties (concerning security
17
interests and software locks), it might not preempt Article Nine.
The federal copyright law preemption issue seems to be less of an
impediment to the establishment of an Article Nine security interest
in the case of a software lock attaching to a mere license to use the
software, as opposed to a transfer of ownership of the copyright in
the software.
Assuming that the GENDOC License Agreement is a "security
agreement" and the software lock in the GENDOC is a valid security interest, what are the rights and obligations of the parties? Without regard to Article Nine, the terms of the License Agreement
govern. If the licensee fails to make a payment when due, and still
fails to make the payment after the appropriate cure period and notice, the agreement terminates by its own terms and the licensee
has agreed that the software may be made inoperable.
What additional rights and obligations are imposed by placing
the transaction under Article Nine? First, if the licensor/secured
party perfected its security interest, then the rights of the licensor/secured party extend to third parties. For instance, if the licensee/debtor executes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the
licensor/secured party's rights would extend to the assignee. Presumably, the same would be true with regard to a trustee in
bankruptcy.
Part 5 of Article Nine sets forth the rights, remedies and duties
of a secured party upon default. U.C.C. section 9-501(1) provides
that a secured party has the rights set forth in Part 5, as well as the
rights set forth in the security agreement, except as those rights
may be limited by section 9-501(3). Section 9-501(3) generally requires the secured party to act in a commercially reasonable manner in disposing of or otherwise acting with regard to the collateral.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1982).
17. U.C.C. § 9-104 comment 1 (1981). See CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1.811] [e] (1980); Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1089 (1978). But cf. Dowell v. Beach Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d
401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
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U.C.C. section 9-503 deals with self-help repossession, which is
essentially what a software lock is designed to accomplish. That
section allows a secured party to repossess the collateral without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace. As an
alternative to removal of the collateral, a secured party may render
"equipment" unusable. A software lock is a device to render the collateral unusable, but the difficult question is whether the collateral
in this case can be considered "equipment." This is where the technical distinction between "goods" and "general intangibles" with regard to software may become relevant. If software is considered to
be a "good," it is "equipment,"'18 and may be disabled under section
9-503.
If software is not "goods," is the "render unusable" provision of
section 9-503 inapplicable? Perhaps so, but it is arguable that insistence on a strict reading of the word "equipment" in section 9-503 is
inconsistent with the intent of the drafters and the stated purpose of
the Uniform Commercial Code that it "shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."'19
IV.

THE SOFTWARE LOCK AS A VEHICLE FOR TORTIOUS
OR OTHER WRONGFUL ACTS

A software vendor must exercise considerable care when using
a software lock. A direct relationship probably exists between the
degree of sophistication of the device and the chance that it will contain a bug that will incorrectly trip the lock. The vendor must balance its own interest in security against the right of its customers to
be free from unreasonable risks of harm. For example, a vendor of
software designed to monitor the vital processes of patients in a hospital intensive care unit would be foolhardy to employ any type of
software lock. On the other hand, the use of a fully tested software
lock in a demonstration version of a nonvital piece of software is a
safe and prudent course of action for that vendor, since the risk of
harm if such a software lock is accidentally tripped is minimal.
Traditional tort law principles adequately govern the balance between the vendor's security and the user's risk of harm. In an appropriate case, the imposition of exemplary damages for the
unreasonable and perhaps outrageous use of a software lock would
be appropriate.
As a supplement to traditional tort law, many states have
18. U.C.C. § 9-109 categorizes goods into four classes: consumer goods, equipment, farm products and inventory. Goods are "equipment" if they are not included
in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods.

19. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1981).
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adopted consumer protection laws, often referred to as "Baby FTC"
statutes. 20 Many of these statutes apply to businesses as well as to
individual consumers. While the author has been unable to find any
reported case dealing with the issue of whether a software lock constitutes an "unfair and deceptive" practice, it is not difficult to imagine a set of facts that might state a claim under an unfair trade
practice statute.
For instance, suppose a software vendor includes a software
lock in a non-demonstration version of payroll software used by a
business, and does not disclose to the user the existence of the lock.
The agreement between the vendor and user requires the user to
make periodic payments. For one reason or another, a payment is
not made. The software lock then trips, disabling the software without any notice to the user. As a result, the user is unable to meet its
payroll obligations, incurring legal liability to its employees and suffering damages in the form of labor unrest. The user sues the vendor, with the gravaman of the complaint being that the undisclosed
software lock and its activation without notice constitutes an unfair
or deceptive act or practice. It is likely that the vendor's motion to
dismiss such a claim for failure to state grounds for relief would be
denied.
On the other hand, if the facts stated above were varied so that
the agreement between the vendor and the user was substantially
similar to the agreement provided in the Appendix, the motion to
dismiss might be more compelling. First, Paragraph 7 of the Agreement discloses the existence of the software lock to the user. Furthermore, assuming the vendor gave the user notice of default as
specified in the Agreement, activation of the software lock would be
accomplished only after the user received notice and an opportunity
to cure.
In one case, 2 1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that repossession without notice under a security agreement and
U.C.C. section 9-503 was not unconscionable, nor was it a violation of
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A (unfair or deceptive acts
or practices). "If Penney was surprised by the repossession, he was
'22
not surprised unfairly.
The standard of what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or
20. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 93A (West 1984); Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, §§ 1,2; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121% §§ 261-272 (1983); Unif. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, §§ 311-317 (1965).
Similar statutes have been enacted in at least 22 jurisdictions. See Benedetto,
The Illinois Conrumer ProtectionAct, 69 ILL. B. J. 350 (Feb. 1981).
21. Penney v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 385 Mass. 715, 433 N.E.2d 901 (1982).
22. Id at 722, 433 N.E.2d at 906.
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practices ought to be the same whether the issue is the activation of
a software lock or the repossession without notice of a fishing boat
pledged as collateral for a bank loan. In either case, the standard
ought to be one of commercial reasonableness. The harm that could
befall the victim in either case must be measured against the legitimate security needs and commercial reasonableness of the actions
of the lender or software vendor. One statement of the governing
standard in a commercial context was provided by Judge Kass of
the Massachusetts Appeals Court: "The objectionable conduct must
attain a level of rascality that would raise on eyebrow of one inured
to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce. '23 Of course,
software is now being licensed to users for personal, household and
family purposes. The standard in this context is certain to be balanced more heavily in favor of the consumer-user.
Article Nine itself imposes substantial duties on the secured
party to act in a commercially reasonable manner. Sanctions exist
under Part 5 of Article Nine for creditor misbehavior. Many of the
provisions under Part 5 deal with the creditor's obligations on disposition of the collateral after it is repossessed. Those requirements
appear to be inapplicable to the activation of a software lock, since
the software is not going to be resold by the creditor, but only disabled in the hands of the debtor. However, the creditor must be
careful to avoid violating these requirements when repossessing or
deactivating software.
One interesting question is whether the activation of a software
lock might involve a breach of the peace. Typically, cases discussing
the issue of self-help repossession involving possible breaches of the
peace deal with situations where there was an actual or threatened
physical confrontation directly related to the repossession. The typical case involves the repossession of an automobile from the
debtor's driveway and involves the threat of physical or constructive
harm by threats or intimidation. If the threatened harm is not phys24
ical, there is no breach of the peace.
Wrongful repossession, however, will subject the secured party
to liability. 25 There is a line of cases involving wrongful reposses23. Levings v. Forbes and Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 504, 396 N.E.2d 149,
153 (1979). But see Hanner v. Classic Auto Body, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 406 N.E.2d 686
(1980) (repairman's unauthorized towing of car in attempt to collect repair amounted
to unfair or deceptive practice).
24. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 550 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1977) (conniving
and lying in the absence of actual or constructive force used to repossess defaulted
debtor's auto did not amount to a breach of the peace).
25. See, e.g., Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (repossession of automobile without notice held to be a conversion).
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sions triggered by inaccurate computer data. In some cases, punitive damages were awarded to the victims as a warning to creditors
26
who rely too heavily on computers to make these decisions.
Software vendors who use software locks would be wise to heed the
teachings of those cases, especially when the users are individual
consumers.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there is a great need for software locks or
other security devices to prevent or minimize the unauthorized use
of computer software. In light of this fact, the software lock, coupled
with a license agreement such as provided in the Appendix, ought to
be enforceable under traditional contract law. Although it is currently unclear, the software lock might also be enforceable as a "security interest" under U.C.C. Article Nine.
While the software lock's misuse can work a substantial hardship upon users, the vendor's potential liability under traditional
tort principles, consumer protection statutes proscribing unfair and
deceptive practices, and the sanctions for creditor misbehavior
under U.C.C. Article Nine, Part 5 ought to limit such misuse. The
failure to disclose the existence of a lock is a prime candidate for
the imposition of such liability.
It is likely that the first widely reported cases involving software
locks will in large part determine their future use, and the legal posture in which such cases arise will be significant. If the issue involves the enforceability of a software lock agreement under U.C.C.
Article Nine, the lock may be found to be an acceptable, albeit modern, form of security interest. If, on the other hand, these first cases
involve charges of careless use, improper activation, or wrongful "repossession," the resulting publicity might inhibit their future use.
APPENDIX A
LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR GENDOC SOFTWARE
1. Parties. Agreement made this __ day of
, 198 by
and between ABC, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation having a place
of business at 456 Lotus Street, Revere, Massachusetts 00000 (hereinafter referred to as "Licensee"), and XYZ Corporation, 112 Star
_

26. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hitchcock, 116 Ga. App. 563, 158 S.E.2d 468 (1967)
($5,000 punitive damages awarded); Swarens v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 447 S.W.2d 53
(Ct. App. Ky. 1969) ($5,000 punitive damages awarded); Price v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. Mo. 1975) ($25,000 punitive damages awarded). See also
Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973) (class action for improper gas company shutoffs via computer; due process violation).
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(hereinafter referred to as

2. Grant of License. Owner hereby grants Licensee a non-exclusive and non-transferable License to use the computer programs
jointly known as the GENDOC. On or about February 1, 198-,
Owner shall deliver to Licensee a working copy of the GENDOC for
use on Licensee's IBM System/38. Licensee is specifically not
granted any right to market any version of the GENDOC.
3. License Fee. The license fee for the use of the GENDOC by
Licensee is $150 per month, payable quarterly in advance. Owner
agrees to provide up to three hours of support service per month at
no additional charge. Licensee agrees to pay, within fifteen days of
invoice, Owner's then current standard hourly charge for all support
services rendered by Owner in excess of three hours per month.
Owner's now current standard hourly charge is $60 per hour.
4. Enhancements to GENDOC. Licensee may ask Owner to
make improvements to the GENDOC. Should the requested improvements be recognized as enhancing the marketability of the
GENDOC, Owner may agree to make such improvements for no additional charge. If, in the opinion of Owner, the improvements
would not make the GENDOC more suitable to the general marketplace, but specifically to the benefit of Licensee, such improvements
may be made at Owner's discretion and at Owner's then current
standard hourly charge, which shall be paid within fifteen days of
invoice.
5. Restrictions on Use. Licensee acknowledges that the
GENDOC is a valuable trade secret of Owner. Licensee warrants
that it has no source code versions of the GENDOC in its possession
or control. Owner authorizes Licensee to use the GENDOC only on
the single computer system at Licensee's site. Licensee may not
disclose, sell, assign, give, allow access to or use of, or otherwise
transfer this License or the GENDOC to any third person without
Owner's prior written approval. Licensee shall safeguard any and
all copies of the GENDOC against unauthorized disclosure and take
such steps as are necessary to insure that the provisions of this
Agreement are not violated by anyone in the service of Licensee.
Licensee shall not disassemble, reverse-compile or tamper in any
way with the GENDOC.
6. Disclaimer of Warranty and Limitation of Liability. This license to use the GENDOC is granted "AS IS." OWNER MAKES
NO WARRANTIES EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE GENDOC. THERE IS NO WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PUR-
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POSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE GENDOC'S QUALITY
AND PERFORMANCE IS WITH LICENSEE. IN NO EVENT
SHALL OWNER BE LIABLE FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM USE
OF THE GENDOC OR THE SUPPORT SERVICES RENDERED
BY OWNER HEREUNDER.
7. Termination of License. The License granted hereunder
shall terminate immediately and the GENDOC programs shall be
rendered inoperable without further notice by Owner upon the occurrence of any of the following:
a. Any default by Licensee of this Agreement which is not
cured within thirty (30) days after written notice thereof by Owner.
b. The default by Licensee, which is not cured within sixty
(60) days after written notice from Owner, of the Software Distribution Agreement between Owner and Licensee dated April 1, 198--,
as it may be amended hereafter.
c. Any payment due Owner pursuant to any agreement between Licensee and any Owner which is not paid within fifteen (15)
days of the date when such payment is due.
d. Ninety (90) days from written notice from Licensee to
Owner seeking to terminate this Agreement accompanied by a written certification by Licensee that the GENDOC and all copies of any
version thereof in Licensee's possession or control have been returned to Owner.
e. The failure or refusal of Licensee, after reasonable notice, to allow Owner access to the computer on which the GENDOC
is operating for the purpose of reinitializing or resetting the automatic shut-down feature of the GENDOC.
8. Marketing of GENDOC. Licensee hereby acknowledges that
it has elected to use for its own business purposes, but not to distribute or market the GENDOC programs which are the subject of
this Agreement. If Licensee elects to market a GENDOC or like
program which it obtains from a source other than Owner, hereafter
"Alternate Program," Licensee agrees that:
a. Licensee shall give Owner at least ninety (90) days prior
written notice of its intent to so market or distribute said Alternate
Program; and
b. Owner or Owner's designated representative shall have
the right to examine the Alternate Program for the purpose of determining if said Alternate Program infringes any right of Owner in the
GENDOC programs.
9. General Terms. This Agreement states the entire agreement
between the parties. No amendment or modification of this Agreement shall be made except by an instrument in writing signed by
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both parties. This Agreement may not be assigned, in whole or in
part, by either party without consent of the other, whicl consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld, except that Owner may assign
its interest in all or part of the payments due it hereunder upon notice in writing to Licensee. This Agreement shall be governed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held to
be unenforceable, such holding shall not affect the enforceability of
any other provision hereof. The obligations of Licensee under
Paragraphs 5 and 8 shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
By:

By:
President
ABC Corporation

President
XYZ Corporation

